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Obligations 
TIMOTHY M. TODD† 
ABSTRACT 
The tax code is designed to raise government revenue. Domestic 
support obligations (DSOs)—namely, child support and spousal 
support—are designed to ameliorate the financial burdens that 
arise upon divorce. To determine the amount of domestic support 
obligations, statutes often refer to commonly used taxation 
concepts, such as “income.” 
Courts determining domestic support obligations have been 
confronted with the question of how to treat “phantom income”—
that is, amounts that are includible as gross income under the 
federal tax code but that have not resulted in any actual current 
cash receipt. Individuals obligated to make domestic support 
payments have argued that phantom income should not be included 
when calculating or modifying such obligations because the 
individual’s ability to pay has not materially changed. This Article 
analyzes the intersection of federal tax law and domestic support 
obligations concerning phantom income. 
This Article considers several solutions—judicial and 
legislative—to address the phantom income issue in the domestic 
support context. Notably, this Article evaluates the current judicial 
decisional framework to examine the potential tax and DSO 
asymmetries. Finally, this Article advances a legislative proposal 
for a charging-order type remedy specific to domestic support 
obligations—one that would resolve the phantom income issue in 
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many situations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tax code is designed to raise government revenue. 
Domestic support obligations, or DSOs—namely child 
support and spousal support—are intended to ameliorate the 
financial burdens that arise upon divorce or separation. To 
determine the amount of domestic support obligations, 
statutes often refer to commonly used taxation concepts, 
such as “income.” 
Courts determining the amount of domestic support 
obligations have been confronted with the question of how to 
treat “phantom income”—that is, amounts that are 
includible as income under the federal tax code but that have 
not resulted in any actual current cash receipt. 
Consequently, individuals obligated to make domestic 
support payments have argued that phantom income should 
not be included when calculating such obligations because 
the individual’s ability to pay has not materially changed. 
This Article analyzes the intersection of federal tax law and 
domestic support obligations concerning phantom income. 
This Article proposes several solutions—judicial and 
legislative—to address the phantom income issue in the 
domestic support context. Notably, this Article evaluates the 
current judicial decisional framework to examine the 
potential tax and DSO asymmetries. This Article will also 
advance a legislative proposal for a charging-order type 
remedy specific to domestic support obligations—one that 
would resolve the phantom income issue in many situations. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A domestic support obligation1 is an umbrella term 
 
 1. In the Bankruptcy Code, for example, a “domestic support obligation” is 
defined as follows: 
a debt . . . that is— 
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generally used to refer to two types of support: (1) spousal 
support (or alimony) and (2) child support. 
A. Spousal Support and Alimony 
Spousal support or alimony is “an allowance for support 
and maintenance, having no other purpose and provided for 
no other object”;2 it is “a substitute for marital support.”3 It 
is “designed to compensate the spouse who is economically 
disadvantaged through her or his role in the marriage and 
not to equalize income in every circumstance.”4 The historic 
 
(A) owed to or recoverable by— 
(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s 
parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or 
(ii) a governmental unit; 
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support (including 
assistance provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former 
spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard 
to whether such debt is expressly so designated; 
(C) established or subject to establishment before, on, or after the 
date of the order for relief in a case under this title, by reason of 
applicable provisions of— 
(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property 
settlement agreement; 
(ii) an order of a court of record; or 
(iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable 
nonbankruptcy law by a governmental unit; . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2012). 
 2. Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N.Y. 566, 569 (1892). As explained by the court 
in Romaine: 
Like the alimentum of the civil law, from which the word was evidently 
derived, it respects a provision for food, clothing and a habitation, or the 
necessary support of the wife after the marriage bond has been severed; 
and since what is thus necessary has more or less of relation to the 
condition, habit of life, and social position of the individual, it is graded 
in the judgment of a court of equity somewhat by regard for these 
circumstances, but never loses its distinctive character. 
Id. at 569–70. 
 3. Warner v. Warner, 17 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1944). 
 4. MARIAN F. DOBBS, DETERMINING CHILD & SPOUSAL SUPPORT § 3:1, Westlaw 
(Database updated Aug. 2018). 
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rationale is that a homemaker’s inward focus—i.e., on the 
home and the children—may leave him or her at a 
disadvantage in the modern workforce.5 Consequently, 
courts and legislatures have devised different types of 
spousal support to ameliorate this disadvantage. The 
common thread, though, is for spousal support to “provide a 
sum for such period of time as needed to maintain the spouse 
in the manner to which the spouse was accustomed during 
the marriage, balanced against the other spouse’s ability to 
pay.”6 
There are three general types of alimony:7 (1) temporary 
alimony,8 (2) permanent alimony, and (3) rehabilitative 
alimony.9 Temporary alimony “is designed to assist the 
claimant spouse in sustaining the same style or standard of 
living that he or she enjoyed while residing with the other 
spouse, pending the litigation of the divorce.”10 Permanent 
alimony is designed generally for “a spouse who is 
disadvantaged through marriage [to] be enabled to enjoy a 
standard of living commensurate with that during the 
marriage.”11 Stated otherwise, the “central objective of 
alimony is, subject to the availability of resources, 
maintenance of the more dependent spouse in an economic 
style close to which the spouse had become accustomed 
during the marriage.”12 Rehabilitative alimony “allows a 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Blank v. Blank, 389 S.E.2d 723, 724 (Va. 1990). 
 7. This even varies by state. For example, Florida has six types of alimony. 
DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3 (describing Florida’s temporary, bridge, lump sum, 
rehabilitative, durational, and permanent alimony regime). 
 8. This may also be referred to as alimony pendente lite or interim support, 
among other terms. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 579, Westlaw 
(database updated Feb. 2019). 
 9. Id. § 570. 
 10. Speight v. Speight, 2003-1152 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/04); 866 So. 2d 344, 346. 
 11. In re Marriage of Schuster, 586 N.E.2d 1345, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 12. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 595 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); see 
also Lentz v. Lentz, 660 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (“The purpose of 
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party needing assistance to become self-supporting without 
becoming destitute in the interim.”13 Indeed, its purpose is 
“to enable the disadvantaged spouse to acquire additional job 
skills, education, or training that will enable him or her to be 
more self-sufficient.”14 Thus, rehabilitative alimony is a 
temporary measure. 
Spousal support is calculated differently from state to 
state, but there are some common themes. Most calculations 
include a variety of factors15—for example, the Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act provides for courts to consider the 
duration of the marriage; the age, emotional, and physical 
condition of the parties; and the ability of the payor-spouse 
to meet his or her own needs.16 Other common factors across 
the states include the duration of the marriage;17 the parties’ 
standard of living;18 the payee’s noneconomic contributions 
to the marriage;19 impairment of the payee’s earning 
capacity;20 the value of contributions allowing the payor to 
increase earning capacity;21 the health of the parties; the age 
 
periodic alimony is to preserve the status the parties enjoyed during the 
marriage.”). 
 13. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So. 2d 124, 130 (Miss. 1995); see also DOBBS, 
supra note 4, § 3:1. 
 14. Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); DOBBS, 
supra note 4, § 3:1. 
 15. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993); 
Scherer v. Scherer, 2015 S.D. 32, ¶ 10, 864 N.W.2d 490, 494; Richardson v. 
Richardson, 2008 UT 57, ¶ 6, 201 P.3d 942, 943; 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and 
Separation, supra note 8, § 667; DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3. 
 16. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974). 
 17. See, e.g., Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280. 
 18. DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:3. 
 19. See, e.g., 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 628, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019). 
 20. See Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280. 
 21. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3.35 (“Spouses who obtain additional 
education or training during the marriage clearly benefit by an increase in their 
lifetime earning potential.”). 
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of the parties;22 and the fault, if any, of the parties.23 
B. Child Support 
Parents have an absolute duty to provide for their 
children.24 This duty emanates from both the common law 
and state statutes.25 The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 
called for the imprisonment of fathers who failed to care for 
their children.26 Indeed, “[p]arental support is a fundamental 
right of all minor children . . . . The right of support is 
inherent and cannot be waived, even by agreement.”27 As 
deftly stated by the Kansas Child Support Guidelines: 
The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of the child. 
The needs of the child are not limited to direct needs for food, 
clothing, school, and entertainment. Child support is also to be used 
to provide for housing, utilities, transportation, and other indirect 
expenses related to the day-to-day care and well-being of the child.28 
Although child support is for the sole benefit of the child, 
it is paid to the custodial parent.29 The recipient custodial 
parent, moreover, holds those funds as a fiduciary for the 
 
 22. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280; see also Kosobud v. Kosobud, 2012 ND 122, 
¶ 17, 817 N.W.2d 384, 393 (“A spousal support obligor’s nearing the age of 
retirement does not immunize the obligor from paying spousal support.”). 
 23. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280. 
 24. E.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 867. 
 25. Id. 
 26. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES (STATUTES), 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: 
FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT (2017), Westlaw 0080 Surveys 4a 
[hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES SURVEY]. 
 27. Abel v. Abel, 824 So. 2d 767, 768 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Ex parte 
Univ. of South Alabama, 541 So. 2d 535, 537 (Ala. 1989)). 
 28. KAN. SUPREME COURT, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 2 (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shellhouse v. Bentley, 666 So. 2d 517, 518 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1995) (“Although child support is paid to the custodial parent, it is for the 
sole benefit of the minor children.”); Howard v. Howard, 2006-CA-00350-COA 
(¶ 24) (Miss. 2007), 968 So. 2d 961, 972 (“Though child support payments are 
made to the custodial parent, the payments are for the benefit of the child.”). 
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child30—a duty that has been compared to that of trustee.31 
The determination of child support rests with the discretion 
of the court.32 The court must “determine a support amount 
that best balances the child’s needs and the parent’s ability 
to pay[.]”33 Nevertheless, “[t]he court’s paramount concern 
when awarding child support is the best interest of the 
[child].”34 
Child support determinations generally start with 
prescribed guidelines.35 Normally, these guidelines set child 
support as a percentage of an income figure—for example, 
gross monthly income.36 Thus, determining items and 
amounts of income are paramount.37 Courts can depart from 
the guidelines for a variety of factors,38 such as special needs, 
the available support from other family members, and other 
 
 30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 518 (2019); Holmes v. Wooley, 792 A.2d 
1018, 1021 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra 
note 8, § 867. 
 31. Holmes, 792 A.2d at 1021 (“It is an interest akin to a trustee’s interest in 
the corpus of a trust.”); Shipman v. N.Y.C. Support Collection Unit, 703 N.Y.S.2d 
389, 394 (2000) (“[T]he child’s custodial parent[ ] stands as trustee of the funds, 
administering money as she deems appropriate for the needs and welfare of the 
child.”); Davidson v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Cranston 
v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994) (“A support payment is the children’s 
money administered in trust by [the custodial parent] for their benefit.”)). 
 32. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, §§ 868, 884. 
 33. Ga. Dep’t of Human Resources v. Prater, 630 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006); see also 24A AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, supra note 8, § 884. 
 34. Stiles v. Stiles, 632 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Va. Ct. App. 2006); see also L.C.S. v. 
S.A.S., 453 S.E.2d 580, 584 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (“In setting an award of child 
support, the ‘primary issue before a trial judge is the welfare and best interests 
of the child, not the convenience or personal preference of a parent.’” (quoting 
Brody v. Brody, 432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1993))). 
 35. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.30 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (2018); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-108.2 (2018); see also CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES SURVEY, supra note 
26. 
 36. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2. 
 37. See, e.g., LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES INTERPRETATION 
& APPLICATION § 4.02 (2018), Westlaw CSGIA. 
 38. See generally 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 888. 
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considerations.39 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, for 
example, requires courts to consider the financial resources 
of the custodial parent, the standard of living the child would 
have had but for the divorce, and the child’s educational 
needs, among other things.40 Although courts are not bound 
by such guidelines, they often serve as rebuttable 
presumptions to the correct amount.41 
C. Modifying Domestic Support Obligations 
Spousal support is typically determined at the time the 
court enters the dissolution or divorce decree.42 If a spouse is 
not entitled to support at that time, normally there is no 
second bite at the eligibility apple.43 However, if a spouse is 
awarded support, it is not uncommon for the support award 
to be modified later in light of a change in circumstances.44 
The ability to modify support is normally based on an express 
statutory grant.45 
Typically, spousal support is subject to modification on 
“showing of materially changed circumstances.”46 In the 
absence of changed circumstances, “a motion for modification 
 
 39. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1. 
 40. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974). 
 41. E.g., Brooks v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 725, 728 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); see also 
24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 887. 
 42. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 4, § 3:1. 
 43. See, e.g., id. (“There is no statutory authority for the trial court to 
reevaluate, postpone, or defer its determination of whether a spouse meets the 
statutory criteria based on a decision or act of an outside entity that occurs after 
the final dissolution decree has been entered.”). 
 44. See, e.g., id. § 6:1. 
 45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.370 
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (2018). 
 46. Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d 522, 524 (N.D. 1990); see also Blaufuss 
v. Ball, 305 P.3d 281, 285 (Alaska 2013) (“Generally, modification of a support 
order is warranted only after a party shows a material and substantial change in 
circumstances.”); Street v. Street, 480 S.E.2d 112, 116 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); DOBBS, 
supra note 4, § 6:1. 
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is nothing more than an impermissible collateral 
attack . . . .”47 The changed circumstances, moreover, must 
be more than temporary.48 Because support is based on the 
parties’ needs and ability to pay, the modification analysis 
focuses on those elements.49 Although ability to pay is a 
factor, it generally cannot be the sole basis for an increase.50 
The standards used to determine any modification are 
generally the same standards used to set the original 
award.51 Other factors include, for example, a serious health 
or physical impairment (and the attending medical 
expenses).52 If, on the other hand, the supported spouse’s 
circumstances change—for example, if he or she obtains new 
employment after divorce—that may be a basis for a 
reduction in support.53 Often, remarriage is an agreed-upon 
ground to terminate or reduce support payments.54 Spousal 
support modifications rest within the trial court’s 
 
 47. In re Marriage of Smith, 225 Cal. App. 3d 469, 480 (1990). 
 48. See generally 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts § 6, Westlaw (database 
updated Feb. 2019); M. L. Cross, Change in Financial Condition or Needs of 
Husband or Wife as Grounds for Modification of Decree for Alimony or 
Maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10 § 4. 
 49. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts § 6, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 
2019). 
 50. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Sheridan, 267 A.2d 343, 346–47 (D.C. 1970) (“The 
criteria by which support payments can be decreased are not applicable in a 
motion to increase. A motion to increase must be founded on the increased needs 
of the children. Indeed, the father’s ability to pay is relevant in granting or 
denying the increase, but it is not the basis on which an increase is initiated or 
founded.”). 
 51. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 6. 
 52. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701. See, e.g., 32 
AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 9. 
 53. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 9; 24A AM. JUR. 2D 
Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701. 
 54. 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 10 (“It is quite common 
to provide, in an agreement between the parties, the decree, or both, that 
remarriage of the supported spouse will terminate support provided in regular 
periodic payments.”); 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 701 
(“The remarriage of a dependent spouse is a consideration for modifying a support 
obligation . . . .”). 
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discretion.55 It may be possible, in limited jurisdictions, for 
the parties to contractually limit the ability to modify 
support payments.56 
Modifying child support is similar to modifying spousal 
support;57 it is based generally on a “material change in 
circumstances occur[ing] after the decree.”58 Moreover, “[t]he 
change must be one that cannot have been reasonably 
anticipated at the time of the original decree and one that 
reasonably affects the parties’ ability to abide by the original 
decree.”59 As with spousal support, “[t]he court may consider 
the parties’ relative financial condition and earning 
capacities in determining whether a material change in 
circumstances has occurred.”60 
D. Federal Tax Background 
The federal tax code levies an individual income tax on 
individual taxable income.61 Taxable income is defined as 
 
 55. Wall v. Wall, 611 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (“[W]e note that 
alimony and child support modifications are matters that rest within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion.”); Keller v. O’Brien, 652 N.E.2d 589, 594 (Mass. 1995) (“We 
generally defer to the probate judge’s sound discretion in determining whether 
modification of an alimony judgment is appropriate.”). See generally 24A AM. JUR. 
2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 693. 
 56. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aronow, 480 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) 
(“Parties can contract and dissolution courts can provide alimony is not 
modifiable, does not terminate on remarriage, or is payable in a lesser sum on 
remarriage.”); 32 AM. JUR. 2D 491 Proof of Facts, supra note 49, § 2. The Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, moreover, provides that “[e]xcept for terms concerning 
the support, custody, or visitation of children, the decree may expressly preclude 
or limit modification of terms set forth in the decree if the separation agreement 
so provides.” UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306(f) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1974). 
 57. See, e.g., 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 8, § 944. 
 58. Howard v. Howard, 2006-CA-00350-COA (¶ 24) (Miss. 2007), 968 So. 2d 
961, 972. 
 59. Id. (citing Poole v. Poole, 96-CA-01124-SCT (¶¶ 19, 21) (Miss. 1997), 701 
So. 2d 813, 818). 
 60. Howard, 968 So. 2d at 972. 
 61. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012). 
2019] PHANTOM INCOME 375 
gross income less allowed deductions.62 The Code has many 
provisions that subsidize socially beneficial behavior or 
promote desirable social policy, such as home ownership63 or 
higher education.64 
Undoubtedly, this is true in the family context. 
Historically, the Code has provided incentives for marriage,65 
child-rearing,66 and dependent care,67 among others. The 
Code also recognizes that not all marriages will last until 
death, and consequently, it provides special rules for 
property distributions upon divorce,68 and—more relevant to 
this Article—provides for the tax treatment of alimony and 
support payments.69 This section will explore the taxation of 
alimony both before and after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA),70 which dramatically changed the taxation of 
alimony. 
Before the TCJA, in a nutshell, the Code allowed the 
payor a deduction for alimony payments71 and required the 
payee to include the same.72 Under the Code, alimony 
requires (1) a payment in cash, (2) that is received by (or on 
behalf of) a spouse (or former spouse), (3) under a divorce or 
separation instrument, (4) that is not disclaimed as alimony, 
 
 62. Id. § 63(a). 
 63. See, e.g., id. § 121 (excluding from gross income the gain from certain 
home sales); id. § 163(h) (allowing a deduction for qualified residence interest). 
 64. See, e.g., id. §§ 25A, 222, 529. See generally F. Philip Manns, Jr. & 
Timothy M. Todd, Higher Education Savings and Planning: Tax and Nontax 
Considerations, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 343 (2018). 
 65. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (combined tax table for married filing jointly). 
 66. See, e.g., id. § 152 (dependency exemption). 
 67. See, e.g., id. § 21. 
 68. See, e.g., id. § 1041. 
 69. See, e.g., id. § 71, repealed by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub.L. 115-97, 
§ 11051(b)(1)(B), 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017); I.R.C. § 215, repealed by Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act, Pub.L. 115-97, § 11051(a) 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017). 
 70. Tax Cuts and Job Act, Pub. L. 115-97 § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2055 (2018). 
 71. I.R.C. § 215. 
 72. Id. § 71(a). 
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(5) and that there is no liability to make a payment after the 
death of the payee spouse.73 If the individuals are legally 
separated, moreover, they cannot be members of the same 
household for a payment to be considered alimony.74 
On the other hand, no deduction is allowed and no 
inclusion is required for child-support payments.75 For child-
support payments, the law presumes a parental obligation to 
support a child to the age of majority notwithstanding 
divorce. Consequently, in the pre-TCJA divorce context, 
much planning went into the proper structuring and 
negotiation of alimony and support payments—just from a 
federal taxation perspective, not to mention the actual 
economic consequences of such payments. However, under 
the TCJA, alimony is no longer deductible by the payor. 
Other tax concepts are relevant, too, because many state 
domestic-support statutes refer to familiar tax concepts, such 
as “income.” In the tax context, gross income, as famously 
elucidated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass,76 means “undeniable accessions to wealth, 
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”77 Consequently, gross income can include non-
cash transactions or items that may not strike the ordinary 
person as taxable, such as bargain sales,78 barter 
transactions,79 or prizes.80 
E. Phantom Income 
The term phantom income is used colloquially when a 
 
 73. Id. § 71(b)(1)(A)–(D). 
 74. Id. § 71(b)(1)(C). 
 75. See id. § 71(c). 
 76. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 77. Id. at 431. 
 78. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (2018). 
 79. E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60. 
 80. I.R.C. § 74. 
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taxpayer receives taxable income but does not presently 
receive cash or other tangible economic benefits.81 Simply 
put, phantom income is having to pay taxes on something 
without receiving, at that time, any commensurate asset 
with which to pay those taxes. In an individual and family 
context, phantom income can arise from a variety of sources, 
such as business pass-through income, discharge of 
indebtedness, and original issue discount. 
1. Business Pass-Through Income 
Business pass-through income is the paradigmatic type 
of phantom income. Generally, partnerships and S 
corporations do not pay income taxes at the entity level.82 
Rather, the net income of the entity is allocated to the entity 
owners,83 who then report that income on their individual tax 
returns.84 The entity reports the income allocation to the 
owners (and sends a copy to the IRS) via Schedule K-1.85 
Although an entity may have positive net income (from 
a tax perspective) that it reports to the owners, that does not 
necessarily mean that the owners have received that same 
amount of cash during the year. In other words, the concepts 
of accounting (taxable) income and cash flow are not 
synonymous. For example, an S corporation that has 
generated positive net taxable income—which the owners 
 
 81. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture 
Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 874, 902 (2003) (noting that phantom income is “income that is taxable 
before any cash is received”). 
 82. I.R.C. § 701 (for partnerships); id. § 1366 (2012 & Supp. 2018) (for S 
corporations)—although some recent developments in partnership taxation can 
make it such that the partnership, as an entity, has an affirmative payment 
obligation. See, e.g., RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
§ 17:19, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2018). 
 83. Id. § 702 (2012); id. § 1366. 
 84. Id. § 61. 
 85. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. INCOME TAX 
RETURN FOR AN S CORPORATION FORM 1120S (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1120s.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SCHEDULE K-1 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1065sk1.pdf. 
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must report on their individual returns—may decide to not 
pay any dividends so that it can reinvest the cash in the 
business and expand it. In this case, the owners will have to 
report that taxable income on their individual tax returns, 
yet the business has distributed no cash to them with which 
to pay that resulting tax liability. This is phantom income. 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that the owner may never see 
any cash from the enterprise, despite annual individual 
income-tax obligations arising from the entity. It may be the 
case, too, for the owner to receive some cash from the entity, 
but not enough to satisfy the tax obligation.86 
2. Cancellation of Debt Income 
In the individual and family context, another common 
tax issue related to phantom income is discharge of 
indebtedness, colloquially known as cancellation of debt 
(COD) income. COD income arises when an outstanding debt 
is satisfied (or forgiven) at less than face value. This principle 
is made clear by the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Kirby Lumber Company.87 
In that case, Kirby Lumber issued bonds for which it 
received the par value in exchange; later that same year, it 
was able to buy back the bonds at less than par, saving more 
than $100,000.88 Holding that the savings constituted gross 
income, the Supreme Court explained: “Here there was no 
shrinkage of assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain. As a 
result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 [in] 
assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now 
extinct.”89 
One rationale advanced in support of taxable COD 
 
 86. Planning, therefore, is paramount with pass-through entities to ensure 
that the owners protect themselves against this phenomenon. This is normally 
achieved via required “tax distributions” that are drafted as part of a 
shareholders’ agreement or operating agreement. 
 87. 284 U.S. 1 (1931). 
 88. Id. at 2. 
 89. Id. at 3. 
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income is the “freeing of assets” theory. As explained by the 
Ninth Circuit, “[u]nder this theory, a taxpayer realizes gain 
when a debt is discharged because after the discharge the 
taxpayer has fewer liabilities to offset her assets. The 
taxpayer’s existing assets, which otherwise would have gone 
toward repaying the debt, are freed.”90 Congress statutorily 
embraced Kirby Lumber in 1954 by adding section 61(a)(12), 
which codified the inclusion of COD income. 
3. Below-Market Loans and Original Issue Discount 
Phantom income in the individual context also 
encompasses original-issue discount and “interest-free” 
loans. The contemporary tax code91 generally does not 
recognize interest-free loans: The Code requires a loan to 
have adequate stated interest, and if it does not, the Code 
will “impute” (create) an interest element.92 Section 7872 
applies to “below-market loans,” which are defined, in effect, 
as loans with either no stated interest or interest that is 
payable at a rate less than the applicable Federal rate.93 
As deftly explained by the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Loans that are subject to [Section 7872] . . . are recharacterized as 
an arm’s-length transaction in which the lender made a loan to the 
borrower in exchange for a note requiring the payment of interest 
at the applicable Federal rate. This rule results in the parties being 
treated as if: (1) The borrower paid interest to the lender that may 
be deductible to the borrower and is included in income by the 
lender; and (2) The lender (a) made a gift subject to the gift tax (in 
 
 90. Merkel v. Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 91. Historically, the Tax Court allowed interest-free loans, with no 
corresponding income imputation. In Dean v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held: 
We have heretofore given full force to interest-free loans for tax 
purposes, holding that they result in no interest deduction for the 
borrower nor interest to the lender. We think it to be equally true that 
an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower[.] 
35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961), nonacq. (citations omitted). Section 7872, however, 
now disallows this result. See I.R.C. § 7872 (2012). 
 92. See I.R.C. § 7872. 
 93. Id. § 7872(e). 
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the case of a gratuitous transaction), or (b) paid a dividend or made 
a capital contribution (in the case of a loan between a corporation 
and a shareholder), or (c) paid compensation (in the case of a loan 
to a person providing services). . . .94 
Although the specific contours and applications to below-
market loans and original-issue discounts are complex—and 
beyond the scope of this Article—the main point is that the 
imputation could result in taxable income without 
necessarily producing a corresponding cash inflow. 
III. THE ISSUE OF PHANTOM INCOME IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
CALCULATIONS 
The issue addressed by this Article is how parties and 
courts treat phantom income when there is no cash inflow 
with which to fund increased domestic support obligations. 
In some cases, a spouse seeking an increased support 
adjustment may achieve only a Pyrrhic victory if he or she 
invests time and money in domestic support litigation, 
prevails in court, and then finds out that the payor has no 
actual cash to fund that judgment. As the next section 
demonstrates, also problematic is the fact that phantom 
income is not treated uniformly by courts. 
A. Judicial Survey 
Courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether 
to include phantom income in domestic support obligations. 
This section surveys the cases that have expressly wrestled 
with the intersection of phantom income and domestic 
support obligations. 
1. Kelley v. Kelley 
In Kelley, the payee-parent challenged the trial court’s 
calculation of child support, arguing that it abused its 
 
 94. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF 
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 528–29 (Joint 
Comm. Print 1985); see also J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME 848–49 (12th ed. 2018). 
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discretion.95 The payor-parent was a recruiter for a financial 
services firm; a part of his compensation package was an 
interest-free loan.96 The firm, though, forgave a portion of the 
loan, and consistent with tax principles, reported the loan 
forgiveness as compensation.97 
The trial court classified the loan forgiveness amounts as 
“phantom income” because “the money was previously 
received and spent, plus [the payee] is not receiving any 
compensation, that is, dollars for it.”98 The trial court, then, 
did not include loan forgiveness from gross income in its 
child-support calculations.99 
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals started with 
the child-support statute, which defines “gross income”: 
“Gross income” includes income from any source, except as excluded 
in this subsection, and includes but is not limited to income from 
salaries, wages, retirement and pension funds, commissions, 
bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, 
annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers’ 
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, 
disability insurance benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 
gifts, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received.100 
The court, commenting on this definition, remarked, 
“[o]bviously, the statute does not specifically address 
whether loan forgiveness is income, and further, no 
Kentucky case has addressed this question.”101 The court 
asserted that “the loan forgiveness amount was not actual 
income but was merely listed for purposes of income tax.”102 
 
 95. Kelley v. Kelley, No. 2012-CA-002213-MR, 2014 WL 5359745, at *3 (Ky. 
Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2014). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at *4; see also I.R.C. § 108 (2012). 
 98. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *4. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *5 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(b)). 
 101. The tax code, for instance, would include loan forgiveness implicit in the 
word “income.” 
 102. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *5 (emphasis added). 
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The appeals court reasoned that tax statutes and child 
support serve different purposes;103 therefore, a “wholesale” 
adoption of the taxable income104 concept was not 
necessary.105 Consequently, the child-support statute’s 
definition of gross income did not include compensatory loan 
forgiveness because it was an “in-kind benefit.”106 
2. Rieger v. Rieger 
The same issue—the treatment of compensatory 
forgivable loans in calculating child support—recently 
confronted a Virginia Circuit Court. This case also involved 
a forgivable loan made by a financial services employer. 
Unlike the Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, in Rieger v. 
Rieger, the Fairfax County Circuit Court held that a 
forgivable loan is includible in gross income for child-support 
purposes.107 
The court started with the family law statutory 
definition of gross income, namely, “all income from all 
sources”— 
and shall include, but not limited to, income from salaries, wages, 
commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, 
pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, capital gains, social 
security…workers’ compensation benefits, unemployment 
insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, veterans’ benefits, 
spousal support, rental income, gifts, prizes or awards.108 
The court concluded that neither the express text of the 
statute nor its legislative history provided insight into 
 
 103. Id. (quoting Snow v. Snow, 24 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000)). 
 104. This is a poor choice of words; taxable income and gross income are two 
different things. Something can be gross income as defined by section 61 (i.e., an 
accession to wealth), yet be statutorily excluded elsewhere in the tax code for 
myriad economic, administrative, and public policy reasons (e.g., gifts, fringe 
benefits, etc.). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 102 (2012) (gifts); id. § 132 (fringe benefits). 
 105. Kelley, 2014 WL 5359745, at *5. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 90 Va. Cir. 29, 36 (2015). 
 108. Rieger, 90 Va. Cir. at 31 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(C)). 
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whether “phantom income” is included.109 After surveying 
some of the case law, the court concluded that “a forgivable 
loan, given to Defendant as a benefit of his employment, 
constitutes gross income for purposes of calculating child 
support.”110 The court compared the loan to a bonus or 
income, both of which would be includible under the 
statute.111 Stated otherwise, “this amount of money 
constitutes nonmonetary income to the Defendant. This is a 
benefit that Defendant receives because of his employment 
and as compensation for his services.”112 Astutely, the court 
added, ‘“loan forgiveness’ saves Defendant an amount of 
money every month that he would otherwise spend repaying 
the ‘loan.’”113 
3. In re Marriage of Kirk 
In In re Marriage of Kirk, the husband formerly owned 
an automobile dealership; he had a large outstanding debt to 
the dealership and entered into a contract with the new 
owners for repayment of the debt.114 Based on the agreement, 
the husband was entitled to an annual bonus which would 
then be automatically used to reduce the indebtedness.115 
The trial court determined that it would not consider as part 
of the husband’s gross income amounts attributable to debt 
reduction owed to an employer.116 The ex-wife appealed.117 
The California Court of Appeals framed the issue as 
“[w]e are here faced with a contractual shift of disposable 
income from child support to the payment of third party 
 
 109. Id. at 32. 
 110. Id. at 36. 
 111. Id. at 36–37. 
 112. Id. at 37. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 266 Cal. Rptr. 76, 77 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 77. 
 117. Id. 
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debt.”118 In the very next sentence, the court concluded, “[o]n 
its face, this is not permissible.”119 The court reasoned that 
“an indebted parent cannot escape liability for the 
paramount obligation to support the parent’s children 
because of indebtedness such parent has created.”120 The 
court described the arrangement as “a contractual obligation 
to shift $4,450 per month, from total gross income of $9,450 
per month, from funds available for child support to the 
repayment of debt.”121 Importantly, “[t]here is nothing to 
suggest that this obligation was sham, unenforceable or 
undertaken as a ruse to avoid child support.”122 
Although the appeals court agreed that, under the 
contract, the $4,450 was not available to pay child support, 
“[t]he error of the court was in failing to consider that the 
only rational inference derivable from the paperwork before 
the court was that this shift was a voluntary diversion of 
income to pay debt, resulting in deprivation of funds for child 
support.”123 The court therefore reversed the trial court and 
explained its rationale as follows: 
Were we to sanction this sort of transaction we can envision all 
manner of special contracts, with employers or others who owe 
money to a supporting parent, which shift funds from available 
income to utilization for other purposes benefiting the parent (such 
as savings plans, retirement plans, miscellaneous fringe benefits), 
resulting in the contention that the support order must be 
reduced.124 
4. Riddle v. Riddle 
In Riddle v. Riddle, a California court was confronted 
 
 118. Id. at 81. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Muldrow, 132 Cal. Rptr. 48, 52 (Ct. App. 
1976)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 82. 
 124. Id. 
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with the divergence between concepts of cash flow and 
income.125 The husband was a financial advisor, and as part 
of his compensation, he was given an advance against his 
future earnings.126 That amount, though, was periodically 
forgiven and treated as discharge-of-indebtedness income by 
his employer.127 The court explained this system as follows: 
“The reason for this convoluted system of payment is fairly 
obvious: It allowed the employer to pay Husband big bucks 
up front, but spread out the payment of tax on the payment 
over time so as to circumvent the progressivity of the tax 
codes.”128 
The court rejected the husband’s argument that his 
income for support purposes should equal his “cash flow.”129 
The court noted, “[w]hile we recognize that family lawyers 
and forensic accountants sometimes use the phrase ‘cash 
flow’ as a sloppy synonym for the word ‘income’ as it appears 
in the support statutes, it isn’t.”130 Indeed, the court 
emphasized that, for child-support purposes, the term 
income “was ‘lifted’ straight from the Internal Revenue 
Code.”131 Therefore, it continued, “[t]hat means that if the 
tax laws say you have income because of the forgiveness-of-
debt, you have income, and that forgiveness-of-debt income 
must go into the calculation of adjusted gross income under 
[the California child-support statutes].”132 Now, the 
California child-support statutes did offer some deductions 
from income—such as for job-related expenses133—but, as 
the court emphasized, “that doesn’t mean that so-called 
 
 125. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 126. Id. at 275. 
 127. Id.; see I.R.C. § 108 (2012). 
 128. Riddle, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 275. 
 129. Id. at 276. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 276–77. 
 133. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4059(f) (West 2019). 
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‘phantom’ income as imputed by the tax laws is any less 
‘income[.]’”134 
5. Poitinger v. Poitinger 
The appellant in Poitinger v. Poitinger argued that he 
had never actually received the cash amounts reported to 
him on a Form K-1, although he acknowledged that those 
amounts were includible as income for tax purposes.135 The 
Ohio Court of Appeals, with little discussion, rejected that 
argument; the court summarily noted that 
[w]hile Appellant introduced tax records in support of his claim, 
Appellant has cited no authority in support of his argument, and 
[the Ohio statute on award and modification of spousal support] is 
silent as to whether ‘phantom income’ should be included in a 
party’s gross income for the purpose of calculating spousal 
support.136 
Because there could also be concerns of income 
manipulation, the court ruled that “[t]he trial court was in a 
better position than [the court of appeals] to make the 
credibility assessments essential to such a determination.”137 
6. Cyr v. Cyr 
In Cyr v. Cyr,138 the issue was whether a living cost 
differential,139 an expatriate premium,140 and a hypothetical 
 
 134. Riddle, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 277. 
 135. Poitinger v. Poitinger, 2005-Ohio-2680, at ¶ 18. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Cyr v. Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504. 
 139. This payment was designed to “enable employees to maintain a lifestyle 
which is broadly comparable to that in their home country, taking account of 
differences in cost-of-living, taxation and social security. . . . [A] living-cost-
differential (LCD) is paid in order to protect the purchasing power of the 
employee’s income in the host location.” Id. ¶ 28. 
 140. This payment was designed to “recognize the disruption an employee, and 
their [sic] accompanying family, experience as a result of an international 
assignment, and as a contribution to costs not addressed elsewhere.” Id. ¶ 29. 
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tax payment141 made by an employer were includible as 
income for support payment calculations. The husband 
argued that “these payments and deductions are not part of 
his gross pay because they exist only to equalize his pay to 
what he would receive for the same work in the U.S.”142 
The court noted that the governing child-support statute 
defined gross income as “the total of all earned and unearned 
income from all sources during a calendar year, whether or 
not the income is taxable. . . .”143 Although the statute lists 
various items of income, the court noted that “[i]t does not 
limit sources of income to the types listed.”144 The court 
concluded that, “[a]lthough the purpose of the extra 
payments husband received over and above his base salary 
was to equalize husband’s salary to its net worth in the U.S., 
they still qualify as income received.”145 
7. In re Marriage of Stress 
In this case,146 the father appealed an order modifying 
his support payments to include expatriate payments.147 The 
expatriate payments included (1) a foreign-services 
premium, designed to offset the cost of living in the foreign 
locale, and (2) the payment of the foreign country taxes, 
described as a tax equalization payment.148 The Colorado 
 
 141. This payment is “actually a deduction taken from the employee’s check, 
similar to the withholding taken from an American company’s paycheck, to cover 
taxes incurred by the employee in both his home country as well as the host 
country.” Id. ¶ 30. 
 142. Id.¶ 31. 
 143. Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.01(C)(7)). 
 144. Cyr v. Cyr, 2005-Ohio-504, at ¶ 34. 
 145. Id. The court further explained that “[w]e understand that this extra 
income was intended to make his pay substantially equivalent in his host country 
to what it would be in his home country. Nonetheless, there is no statutory 
allowance for exempting this income from his gross income for child support 
calculations.” Id. 
 146. In re Marriage of Stress, 939 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1997). 
 147. Id. at 501. 
 148. Id. 
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statute for child support defined gross income as “income 
from ‘any source,’ with the limited and specified exclusion of 
funds received from public assistance or voluntary overtime 
pay.”149 
The father argued that “the tax equalization payment is 
only ‘phantom income’ which is not reasonably available to 
him for child-support payments and, thus, is not properly 
included in his gross income for child support purposes.”150 
The court disagreed, and held that “the tax equalization 
payment constituted a lump-sum addition to salary to offset 
a lump-sum withholding tax.”151 The court noted, “[t]hat 
[the] father did not actually receive the lump-sum payment 
prior to its submission to the Canadian tax authorities is no 
different in effect from the more common system of 
incremental withholding for tax purposes. . . .”152 Indeed, the 
court emphasized that the Colorado support statute “does 
not provide for deduction of federal and state income taxes or 
FICA taxes in computing gross income for purposes of 
calculating child support.”153 The court found no authority 
“that would require an inconsistent treatment of [the] 
father’s Canadian income taxes.”154 
8. Marron v. Marron 
In this case,155 the husband appealed the trial court’s 
determination of his income for spousal and child support.156 
The husband owned several corporations, all of which were 
 
 149. Id. at 502 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(a) (1996 cum. supp.)); 
see also In re Marriage of Campbell, 905 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. App. 1995); In re 
Marriage of Tessmer, 903 P.2d 1194 (Colo. App. 1995) (noting that exceptions are 
provided in the statute). 
 150. Stress, 939 P.2d at 502. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Marron v. Marron, 2014-Ohio-2121. 
 156. Id. ¶ 9. 
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taxed as S corporations.157 The husband argued that the trial 
court erred by including the phantom income from the S 
corporations in the support calculations—in particular, “that 
the K-1 income retained by the corporations should not be 
included in his income because he did not receive it, he had 
no legal right to demand it, and he had never received any 
cash distribution from these companies with the exception of 
a tax draw in later years.”158 
Here, the support statute defined gross income as: 
the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during 
a calendar year, whether or not the income is taxable, and includes 
income from salaries, wages, overtime pay, and bonuses to the 
extent described in [Section 3119.05(D) of the statute]; 
commissions; royalties; tips; rents; dividends; severance pay; 
pensions; interest . . . and all other sources of income. ‘Gross income’ 
includes . . . self-generated income; and potential cash flow from 
any source.159 
Furthermore, the support statute defined the term “self-
generated income” as “gross receipts received by a parent 
from . . . [a] closely held corporation, and rents minus 
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by the parent in 
generating the gross receipts.”160 
The appeals court sustained the trial court’s judgment to 
include the K-1 income. The court reasoned that “whether or 
not Husband received a cash distribution from the K-1 
income, the retained K-1 income increased Husband’s wealth 
through his ownership interest in the companies.”161 
Moreover, the court also explained that: 
There was evidence that Husband exercised significant control over 
the companies. Husband was able to convince his father to make 
distributions from the family-owned corporations to cover the tax 
liabilities associated with the K-1 income contrary to the previous 
 
 157. Id. ¶ 3. 
 158. Id. ¶ 9. 
 159. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.01(C)(7)). 
 160. Id. (quoting § 3119.01(C)(13)). 
 161. Id. ¶ 22. 
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custom. The “tax distributions” were significantly larger than taxes 
due on the K-1 income. Further, Wife testified that Husband’s 
family had shaped the companies to minimize a spouse’s support 
obligation in a divorce.162 
B. Analysis of the Case Law 
As the above demonstrates, there are several key issues 
present in most of the cases, the chief of which is the 
statutory construction surrounding the term “gross income” 
or “income” in the state support statute. Another issue and 
concern raised by the courts is the specter of financial 
gamesmanship by the recipient of the phantom income—i.e., 
intentionally not receiving cash to save on the support 
obligation. These issues will be discussed in turn. 
1. Using the Federal Tax Definition of Income 
The goal in interpreting any statute is to “[give] effect to 
the text that the lawmakers have adopted.”163 A key 
interpretation canon is the supremacy-of-text principle, 
which provides that “[t]he words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, 
is what the text means.”164 Effectuating that goal, moreover, 
the ordinary-meaning canon provides “[w]ords are to be 
understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the 
context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”165 This 
canon, then, introduces an interesting wrinkle to the 
interpretation analysis: Should the term “income” (and 
related terms) in support statutes be construed in the 
“everyday” sense of the word, or in its technical federal tax 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 29 (2012); see also Timothy M. Todd, The Tail that Wags the Dog: 
The Problem of Pre-Merit-Decision Interim Fees and Moral Hazard in the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 63 KAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2014). 
 164. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 163, at 56. 
 165. Id. at 69 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner further wrote 
that “[t]he ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of 
interpretation.” Id. 
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meaning? Naturally, different states define “income” 
differently for support purposes.166 
Well, that issue raises another sensible question: Are 
those two definitions (the everyday definition of “income” and 
the technical tax definition of “income”) even different? 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “income,” as 
relevant here, as “a gain or recurrent benefit [usually] 
measured in money that derives from capital or labor; also: 
the amount of such gain received in a period of time.”167 The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “income” as “[t]hat which 
comes in as the periodical produce of one’s work, business, 
lands, or investments (considered in reference to its amount, 
and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or 
periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation; 
revenue.”168 
Those definitions are different, at least at the margins. 
Interestingly, the federal tax definition of income has not 
enjoyed a static definition; actually, quite the opposite is 
true. The genesis for the modern federal income tax is the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which was passed in 1913.169 It 
provides that “[t]he Congress shall have the power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”170 A few years 
later, the Supreme Court addressed the tax concept of 
“income” in Eisner v. Macomber.171 
In Eisner, the Court was confronted with the issue of 
whether “Congress has the power to tax, as income of the 
 
 166. See, e.g., DETERMINATION OF INCOME FOR CALCULATING CHILD SUPPORT, 50 
STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT (2018), 
Westlaw 0080 Surveys 5. 
 167. Income, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
 168. Income, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 169. See BURKE & FRIEL, supra note 94, at 5. 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 171. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
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stockholder and without apportionment, a stock dividend 
made lawfully and in good faith against profits accumulated 
by [a] corporation . . . .”172 The Court described income as 
“the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained 
through a sale or conversion of capital assets.”173 The Court 
concluded, in effect, that because the shareholder received 
“nothing out of the company’s assets for his separate use and 
benefit[,]” the stock dividend was not income.174 
A few years after Macomber, the Board of Tax Appeals 
further explained the concept of income for taxing purposes. 
In Hawkins v. Commissioner, in deciding whether a 
settlement for libel and slander is taxable, the Board noted: 
it is conceivable that since the income tax is primarily an 
application of the idea of measuring taxes by financial ability to pay, 
as indicated by the net accretions to one’s economic wealth during 
the year, there may be cases in which taxable income will be 
judicially found although outside the precise scope of the description 
already given.175 
The modern and most famous tax definition of income is 
found in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.176 In Glenshaw, 
the Court was confronted with the question of whether the 
receipt of antitrust exemplary damages constituted gross 
income.177 Noting that Congress desired to exert “the full 
measure of its taxing power,”178 the Court held that the 
damages were gross income because they represented 
 
 172. Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. at 207 (internal quotations omitted). 
 174. Id. at 211. A stock dividend does not change a shareholder’s investment 
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 175. 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1024 (1927). 
 176. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 177. Id. at 427. 
 178. Id. at 429; see also Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); 
Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216, 223 (1937); Douglas v. 
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“instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete 
dominion.”179 Under Glenshaw, a pure windfall—even one 
divorced from one’s capital or labor, contrary to Macomber—
is income subject to taxation.180 Despite departing from 
Macomber’s capital and labor distinction, Glenshaw still 
retained the historical realization requirement.181 
Some differences exist between the dictionary definitions 
and the tax definition of income. Consider, for example, 
Merriam-Webster’s definition, which is effectively the 
Macomber definition. However, under Macomber and 
Merriam-Webster, the antitrust damages would not be 
income, as they do not originate from capital or labor. 
Similarly, it does not appear as though the Oxford definition 
would capture Glenshaw’s damages either, as they did not 
arise from “one’s work, business, lands, or investments . . . .” 
Also interesting is that neither dictionary definition 
contemplates the realization element, which is expressed in 
Glenshaw’s definition for something to be income. The 
realization concept “was developed soon after the ratification 
of the sixteenth amendment and the passage of the Tariff Act 
of 1913.”182 In its early form, the realization requirement 
meant that “appreciation in the value of an asset does not 
constitute income under the sixteenth amendment in the 
absence of an event that separates the appreciation from the 
related capital.”183 Normally, this event occurs with a sale or 
 
 179. Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 431. 
 180. See Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 295, 301 (2011) (“Because windfalls do not proceed from the recipient’s labor 
or capital or both combined, the punitive damages received by Glenshaw Glass 
could not be income under the Macomber definition . . . .”). 
 181. Id. at 303 (“The Glenshaw Glass definition preserves the realization 
requirement but is broad enough to encompass windfall gains . . . .”). 
 182. Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner: 
Refining the Concept of Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439 (1991) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 183. Id. at 439–40. 
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disposition of property.184 
A classic realization case is Helvering v. Horst.185 The 
Supreme Court explained: 
Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income. 
From the beginning the revenue laws have been interpreted as 
defining ‘realization’ of income as the taxable event, rather than the 
acquisition of the right to receive it. And ‘realization’ is not deemed 
to occur until the income is paid. But the decisions and regulations 
have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or property is not 
the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the 
cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment 
of income in money or property realization may occur when the last 
step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain 
which has already accrued to him.186 
Stated simply, not all economic gains are taxable gross 
income because the gain is not yet realized in tangible form. 
The simplest example is year-to-year fluctuations in stock 
owned by a taxpayer; those fluctuations are not income (in 
the tax sense); the “income” for tax purposes arises only 
when that stock is sold or otherwise disposed, i.e., when there 
is a realization event.187 
2. Economic Definitions of Income 
Yet another wrinkle in defining income is that 
economists have an entirely different definition of income 
than tax attorneys do. Probably the most famous economic 
view of income is that of Robert Haig and Henry Simons, 
referred to as the Haig-Simons definition of income.188 
Robert Haig first proposed the definition of income as 
[T]he increase or accretion in one’s power to satisfy his wants in a 
given period in so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or 
(b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money. More 
simply stated, the definition of income which the economist offers is 
 
 184. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2012). 
 185. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). 
 186. Id. at 115. 
 187. I.R.C. § 1001. 
 188. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 180, at 304. 
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this: Income is the money value of the net accretion to one’s economic 
power between two points of time.189 
Henry Simons published his definition—considered a 
refinement of Haig’s definition—which defined income as 
“the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised 
in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store 
of property rights between the beginning and end of the 
period in question.”190 As Simons further noted, “in other 
words, [income] is merely the result obtained by adding 
consumption during the period to ‘wealth’ at the end of the 
period and then subtracting ‘wealth’ at the beginning.”191 As 
tax commentators have argued, the Haig-Simons broad 
definition “allows it to serve the goal of raising maximum 
revenue while also being maximally equitable and efficient 
and therefore serving two important tax policy objectives.”192 
In effect, Haig-Simons includes all accessions to wealth, 
whether realized or not.193 
3. The Wrinkle of Exemptions 
Another issue that could readily arise is, does strict tax 
incorporation apply in other contexts? What about an item of 
income that is exempted for tax purposes—does that 
exemption carry over into the support context? Section 102 
is the most basic example. 
Section 102 provides that “[g]ross income does not 
include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, 
devise, or inheritance.”194 Therefore, gifts are not subject to 
 
 189. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921); see also Christopher 
H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 435, 437 (2006). 
 190. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); see also Abreu 
& Greenstein, supra note 180, at 304; Hanna, supra note 189, at 437. 
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income tax,195 so received gifts would never show on the Form 
1040 of an individual recipient. Nevertheless, gifts are 
undoubtedly increases in economic assets (increases in the 
store of property rights, à la Haig-Simons). How, then, 
should gifts factor into the phantom-income analysis for 
domestic support obligations? If the strict incorporation 
argument wins the day—arguing that tax definitions 
control—gifts are not an item of income. From a policy 
perspective, though, this seems incongruous, as a gift 
represents an increase in assets that could be shared with 
the payees. 
Section 121 is another prime example. Section 121 
provides that “[g]ross income shall not include gain from the 
sale or exchange of property if, during the 5-year period 
ending on the date of the sale or exchange, such property has 
been owned and used by the taxpayer as the taxpayer’s 
principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or 
more.”196 This exclusion is limited to either $250,000 or 
$500,000 of gain, depending on the taxpayer’s filing status.197 
Consider the example, then, of a recently divorced person 
who sells his or her home for $300,000, having purchased it 
many years ago for $100,000. Of the $200,000 in economic 
gain,198 none of it is taxable due to the operation of section 
121. 
From an economic (Haig-Simons) or colloquial 
perspective, the $200,000 seems like income, but from a tax 
perspective, no gross income is involved (due to the statutory 
exclusion). Which definition should control? Do the same 
rationales that support the section 121 exclusion—namely, 
providing for a fluid and dynamic housing market (reducing 
barriers to selling one’s home)—justify not including the 
 
 195. There could, of course, be gift taxes that are owed primarily by the donor. 
 196. I.R.C. § 121(a). 
 197. I.R.C. § 121(b)(1)–(2). 
 198. That is, the amount realized from the transaction less the basis (i.e., 
investment in the property). 
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profits from the sale in support calculations? 
Section 74 is also relevant. This section provides that 
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, or in section 
117 (relating to qualified scholarships), gross income 
includes amounts received as prizes and awards.”199 This 
restates the general rule in Glenshaw and section 61: all 
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, are gross income. 
However, due to various (largely political) reasons, section 
74(d) then provides “[g]ross income shall not include the 
value of any medal awarded in, or any prize money received 
from the United States Olympic Committee on account of, 
competition in the Olympic Games or Paralympic Games.”200 
On a net basis, then, an Olympic award is not gross 
income for tax purposes, but should it be considered income 
for support purposes? Do the same political reasons that 
underline the tax exclusion justify an exclusion for domestic 
support purposes? The answer is likely “no.” 
4. The Wrinkle of Administrative Practicalities 
Despite section 61 and Glenshaw Glass’s broad reach, 
the government has administratively retracted it in part. 
One such example is the general welfare exception (GWE).201 
Under this doctrine, “some government payments do not 
constitute gross income to the recipients.”202 For example, 
“the classic example of the GWE’s application is a 
government payment made to victims of a natural 
disaster.”203 The general welfare exception first appeared in 
1938, “when the IRS determined that welfare payments 
(from the then-recently enacted Social Security Act) could be 
 
 199. I.R.C. § 74. 
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excluded from gross income.”204 The IRS, moreover, has 
expressly invoked the general welfare exception. For 
example, in Revenue Ruling 63-163, the IRS determined: 
Benefit payments made under the Area Redevelopment Act and the 
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 are intended to 
aid the recipients in their efforts to acquire new skills that will 
enable them to obtain better employment opportunities, and, as 
such, fall in the same category as other unemployment relief 
payments made for the promotion of the general welfare.205 
Indeed, the IRS has explained the general welfare 
exception as follows: “[P]ayments under legislatively 
provided social benefit programs for the promotion of general 
welfare are not includible in an individual’s gross income.”206 
The general welfare exception elements are that the 
payments must “(1) be made from a governmental general 
welfare fund; (2) be for the promotion of the general welfare 
(i.e., on the basis of need rather than to all residents without 
regard to, for example, financial status, health, educational 
background, or employment status) and (3) not be made with 
respect to services rendered by the recipient.”207 
Another income exception, and one that is incredibly ad 
hoc, occurs when the IRS pronounces that a certain item will 
not be considered income, even though it otherwise fits 
within Glenshaw and section 61’s definition. A classic 
example is the treatment of frequent flyer miles earned 
through business travel.208 The IRS has basically thrown in 
the towel on trying to tax these items. In Announcement 
2002-18, the IRS stated that “[c]onsistent with prior practice, 
the IRS will not assert that any taxpayer has understated 
his federal tax liability by reason of the receipt or personal 
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use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind promotional 
benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s business or official 
travel.”209 Under Glenshaw Glass, though, these items seem 
to be “accessions to wealth” and are “clearly realized” (that 
is, something of value that the taxpayer has control over). 
Are they still gross income in the context of domestic support 
obligations? 
As demonstrated, then, there are now at least three 
different operable definitions of income: (1) the colloquial 
meaning, (2) the tax attorney’s definition, and (3) the 
economist’s definition. However, just arriving at a general 
definition does not solve the issue, as the tax attorney 
definition has even more wrinkles, many of which have not 
been contemplated by the phantom-income cases. 
Consequently, it is unwise and possibly over- or under-
inclusive to simply incorporate the full tax literature and 
concepts of income into the domestic support analysis, as the 
two contexts are not necessarily coterminous. 
5. Phantom Income Ipse Dixit 
Another issue is that the cases and litigants sometimes 
call things phantom income that are not phantom income in 
reality—at least not from the perspective of a tax attorney. 
This muddies the waters and makes it harder to clarify and 
resolve true cases of phantom income. 
Consider Cyr v. Cyr, which considered the effect of a 
living cost differential, an expatriate premium, and a 
hypothetical tax payment on the support obligation.210 The 
husband argued that these items constituted phantom 
income.211 The court explained the hypothetical tax payment 
as basically a withholding requirement, noting “[t]hat 
although the employee never receives it, it is still gross 
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income to the employee.”212 Withholdings are not phantom 
income. Withholdings are not received by the taxpayer 
because they are paid to another to satisfy the taxpayer’s 
obligation to the payee. Stated otherwise, cash is transferred 
in these situations, just not to the wage earner; in true 
phantom-income cases, there is no present cash transfer to 
any payee. 
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Stress, the court 
considered an equalization payment, which the father 
argued constituted phantom income.213 The equalization 
payment was “credited in a lump sum to father’s final 
paycheck each year, and at the same time deducted for 
payment of father’s Canadian income taxes.”214 The father 
argued that such a payment is “not reasonably available to 
him for child support payments and, thus, is not properly 
included in his gross income for child support purposes.”215 
Again, the court did not argue with the classification of the 
payment as phantom income. Even though the court 
concluded that the amounts were income for support 
purposes, it missed an opportunity to clarify whether or not 
such amounts are classified properly as “phantom.” 
In both of the above cases, employers actually 
transferred cash, even though the wage earners were not the 
ultimate payees (the taxing authorities were). This is 
markedly different from the prototypical Schedule K-1 pass-
through phantom income (pure phantom income), when an 
entity has (perhaps) accrual taxable income and resultant 
pass-through income, with potentially no actual cash 
transfer. For example, if a corporate customer buys goods on 
credit from an accrual-basis corporation, that corporation 
has income that is taxable, even though no cash actually 
changes hands. In the case of a pass-through entity, the 
 
 212. Id. ¶ 30. 
 213. 939 P.2d 500, 502 (Colo. App. 1997). 
 214. Id. at 501. 
 215. Id. at 502. 
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owner would need to report that income, even though no cash 
is involved (only potential future cash is involved). 
6. Timing Asymmetries 
At bottom, there appear to be at least two time-based 
issues that need to be resolved in connection with the timing 
asymmetry between cash receipt and income inclusion 
(particularly when incorporating tax principles). First, there 
are situations in which cash was received in the past, but the 
“income” occurs now; for example, cancellation of debt 
income (henceforth Category 1 asymmetries). Second, there 
are situations in which the income occurs now, but cash may 
(or may not) be received in the future, such as pass-through 
business income (henceforth Category 2 asymmetries). The 
judicial and charging-order-type remedies will consider these 
timing asymmetries. 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PHANTOM INCOME ISSUE IN DOMESTIC 
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS CONTEXT 
This Article addresses two possible solutions to the 
phantom income issue in the domestic support context. The 
first is to keep the status quo rule that implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly) incorporates the tax definition of 
income and includes phantom income in support 
calculations; the second is to implement a charging-order-
type remedy to balance the concerns of payors and payees 
vis-à-vis phantom income. 
A. Incorporating Tax Definitions 
The first option is simply to incorporate federal tax 
definitions of income into the phantom income/domestic 
support obligation context. As the case survey demonstrates, 
this is the apparent majority rule,216 and naturally, this is 
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the simplest and easiest option. However, this solution does 
not truly solve the two categories of asymmetry, nor does it 
solve the other issues identified earlier when incorporating 
tax principles—i.e., the tax-incorporation option does not 
provide clear answers to issues such as tax exclusions, 
administrative exclusions, and other issues that are specific 
to tax policy and administration but have no analog in 
domestic support contexts. 
Consider, for example, the cancellation-of-indebtedness 
income example. When the loan (and its cash) is extended, 
no taxable income results, because there was no accession to 
wealth.217 Although the taxpayer’s assets were increased by 
the amount of the cash borrowed, this gain was offset by the 
increased loan liability. If the loan is later forgiven (in whole 
or in part), the Code includes in gross income the difference 
between the loaned amount and that forgiven.218 
It may even be the case that the family did benefit from 
the cash (when it was not taxed as loan proceeds) if the loan 
was extended pre-separation—that is, if the family had the 
opportunity to consume it. To also include the COD income 
post-separation for domestic support obligations would be 
akin to double consumption by the DSO payee; that is, they 
were able to consume the loan proceeds and then also 
consume the later-in-time DSO payment. In sum, there are 
asymmetries and timing differences between taxation and 
consumption that would result from total incorporation of 
tax principles in DSO calculations. 
Moreover, tax concepts may cut both ways and may 
actually work to the disadvantage of DSO payees in certain 
situations in which the tax and DSO policies diverge. 
Consider, for example, the inequity of a whole incorporation 
of tax concepts when factoring in exclusions. Gifts are 
income-tax free,219 but represent a true asset (or cash) 
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increase. In the main, the receipt of a gift represents 
additional assets a family could use for consumption but that 
are outside the definition of gross income. Similarly, Roth 
IRA distributions—which are received tax-free if planned 
properly—are designed to be used as retirement 
consumption but are outside the definition of gross income. 
In both cases, though, those funds could readily be consumed 
by the family. In sum, a strict incorporation of tax concepts 
does not solve all the phantom-income issues and related 
issues. Fortunately, there are cases that recognize that 
income for tax purposes and income for DSO purposes 
(especially for child support) are not coterminous.220 
B. Charging-Order Type Remedy 
Another solution is for legislatures to embrace a 
charging-order-type remedy specific for domestic support 
obligations. A charging order refers to “the discrete remedy 
of diverting distributions attributable to the interest charged 
to the creditor until the amount owed is satisfied. . . .”221 
Under a charging order, when cash distributions are made 
from the entity, the distributions for the debtor-member are 
paid to the holder of the charging order (the creditor). The 
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charging order arose under partnership law to balance the 
need of the creditor to attach assets of the debtor (like the 
partnership interest), while reducing the disruption to the 
underlying business; such an order prevents the creditor 
from asserting management or control rights.222 
Interestingly, the issues faced by creditors of LLC 
members are similar to the issues faced by former spouses in 
the above-mentioned cases. For example, the debtor (i.e., the 
LLC member) can have taxable income (such as partnership 
income flow-through) but may not necessarily have a 
corresponding cash distribution. This is similar to the 
situation of the debtor former spouse who has potentially 
phantom income without a corresponding cash flow. A 
related concern is the issue of cash gamesmanship; that is, 
the LLC—which may be controlled completely by the 
debtor—may decide to not distribute cash for fear it will be 
collected by a creditor. This concern has been raised in the 
above cases as well. 
Consequently, the presence of a charging-order-type 
remedy specific to domestic support obligations could provide 
a common-sense solution in complex scenarios, balancing the 
competing claims of increased taxable income and uncertain 
cash flow. A charging-order-type remedy is ideal in Category 
2 situations—those in which there is the potential for a cash 
flow in the future. The charging order can be applied against 
the source of that potential future cash flow. 
In the partnership/LLC context, the charging order is 
applied specifically, i.e., with respect to a particular business 
entity. Such a clean demarcation is not always present in the 
domestic support context. However, the remedy could still be 
applied in many instances. For example, in the above cases 
of Poitinger and Marron, the sources of the phantom income 
were actual business entities; thus, a charging order could be 
specific to cash distributions from those businesses or from 
later stock sales (if the payor is an equity holder). 
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But what about those cases in which a charging order 
cannot be aimed toward a specific asset or business 
enterprise? Those cases are more problematic, and the 
charging-order remedy may not be an effective fix.223 In such 
cases, the court may need to craft a payment schedule after 
extensive fact-finding regarding actual changes in cash flow, 
if any. It may be that there is a close proxy for an underlying 
asset. Consider, for example, Kelley, in which there was COD 
income arising out of an employment-based loan. There, the 
ex-spouse/payor owned stock in the employer. The charging 
order could be directed at cash flows and receipts from the 
ex-spouse’s later stock sales of that company. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article addressed the developing intersection 
between the federal income-tax concept of phantom income 
and its impact on domestic support obligations. As shown, 
the tax code and support statutes have different goals and 
objectives; thus, a simple incorporation adoption of 
equivalent terms and definitions may not be an optimal 
solution. In addition, two timing asymmetries highlight the 
thorny intersection between tax principles and domestic 
support obligations—and in some of the cases, true phantom 
income is not even at issue (despite its invocation). This 
Article thus suggests a DSO-specific charging-order-type 
remedy to help balance the concerns expressed by the case 
law. While the charging-order solution may not fit all 
circumstances, it nevertheless advances the literature and 
provides a workable solution in many true phantom income 
cases. 
 
 223. In any event, there may be other remedies available depending on state 
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